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1 Introduction
Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increased the
actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises (MNEs). This poses challenges
for host countries’ tax and regulation policies. For a number of countries, such as, for
example, the member countries of the European Union, the policy challenge is two-faceted.
First, they are facing competition from other similar (e.g. EU member) countries, where
national governments try to attract new corporate investments.1 Second, many MNEs
have attractive investment and localisation options in entirely diﬀerent countries (outside
the EU-area), e.g., in low cost countries. As global developments make such outside options
more accessible and attractive for MNEs, how will host countries react? What will be the
implications for their tax and regulatory policies, for the MNEs’ investment decisions and
for host countries’ welfare? In this paper we address these issues. An interesting finding
is that more attractive outside options for MNEs may constitute a win-win situation; the
MNE as well as its present host countries may gain when this occurs. The reason is that
a more attractive outside option for the firm may aﬀect the strategic tax and regulatory
competition between its present host countries in such a way that a Pareto improvement
is brought about.
In line with the complex characteristics of most multinational firms,2 we assume that
the firm has better information than the governments about its eﬃciency.3 We consider the
case where eﬃciency is positively correlated across these operations. Possessing private
information about eﬃciency, i.e. about its ability to produce at low cost domestically,
the MNE has incentives to undertake strategic investments. On the one hand, to receive
favorable treatment in terms of taxation and regulation, the firm may like to be conceived
1 In general, foreign direct investments have been rapidly increasing (see Markusen (1995)), and recent
empirical research show that eﬀective tax rates are important factors for determining the localisation
decisions of multinational enterprises (see, e.g., Devereux and Freeman (1995)).
2According to Markusen (1995), multinationals tend to be important in industries and firms that are
characterised by: high levels of R&D relative to sales, a large share of professional and technical workers
in their workforce, products that are new or technically complex, and high levels of product diﬀerentiation
and advertising.
3The international nature of an MNE and the high number of interfirm transactions make it hard for
authorities to observe its true income and costs. Complex technology also implies obstacles for authorities
to ascertain the firm’s eﬃciency, and thereby derive its true operating profits. Many of the inputs are not
standard commodities with established market prices, making it diﬃcult to monitor costs or impose norm
prices.
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as a low-productivity type in the EU-countries. But it would also like to indicate that it
is highly mobile, i.e., unless operating conditions in the EU-area are suﬃciently favorable,
it may reschedule investments or migrate altogether to another region where net costs
are lower. To signal a credible threat of relocation, the firm would like to be conceived
as having a high reservation profit, i.e., a high productivity on alternative investments.
However, under the reasonable assumption that the firm’s productivities inside and outside
the EU-area are positively correlated, the firm cannot at the same time indicate a low and
a high productivity. In this situation of countervailing incentives the outside option for
the firm may actually have the eﬀect of limiting the firm’s information rent.
In addressing these issues, the paper complements the regulation theory literature
by combining countervailing incentives (see Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and
Rodríguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000)) and common agency (Martimort (1992), Stole
(1992), Martimort and Stole (2002)). Multiprincipal regulatory problems with counter-
vailing incentives have previously been analysed by Mezzetti (1997), but in a diﬀerent
(and complementary) setting.4 There is by now a considerable literature analysing tax
and regulatory competition in various settings, see Gresik (2001) for a general survey
and Bond and Gresik (1996), Olsen and Osmundsen (2001, 2003) and Calzolari (2001) for
analyses in common agency frameworks. The novel feature considered here is the strategic
implications of better outside options for firms, and in particular of outside options that
are relatively more attractive for very eﬃcient firms.
In several parts of the world countries work to coordinate and harmonize their regu-
latory and tax policies. The EU is a prominent example. We analyse the eﬀects of such
measures by comparing outcomes for cooperating and competing countries, respectively.
We show that with the presence of an outside option, tax and regulatory competition
- relative to coordination - may entail lower investments for ineﬃcient firms and higher
investments for eﬃcient ones, and that the firm’s profits may be lower or higher when
the countries compete than when they cooperate. Whether the firm is better or worse
oﬀ under policy competition relative to policy coordination, depends among other things
4 In Mezzetti (1997) the agent has private information about his relative productivity in the tasks he
performs for two principals. With this informational assumption Mezzetti obtains a case of countervailing
incentives and contract complements. In our model the agent has private information about his absolute
eﬃciency level, the relevant actions are contract substitutes, and the presence of countervailing incentives
is due to an outside option. The two models yield diﬀerent implications; e.g. whereas Mezzetti obtains
equilibria with pooling for a range of intermediate types, we obtain fully separating equilibria.
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on market demand, investment substitution possibilities and its ownership structure. A
firm that sells a private good subject to price regulation is better oﬀ under a cooperative
relative to a competitive regime when market demand is relatively inelastic, the firm’s
investment cost function has a low elasticity of substitution, or if owner shares held by
residents of the cooperating countries are large The associated investment pattern leads
to prices that are lower for high-eﬃciency firms but higher for low-eﬃciency firms under
competition compared to cooperation. And as already mentioned, we also show that a
higher outside option for the firm may actually be beneficial for the firm’s host countries
when they are engaged in tax and regulatory competition with each other. This means
that better outside options for the firm may reduce the gains from policy coordination
and thus reduce host countries’ incentives to coordinate their policies.
2 The model
The framework is fairly general and captures several situations. The firm is active in two
countries, and it may invest additional resources (K1,K2) there. Absent public transfers
and other regulations directed specifically at the firm, these investments will generate
some profits for the firm and benefits for other groups of each domestic economy. For
instance, the investment may enable or enhance the supply of a public good, the benefits
of which depend on the amount invested domestically (Ki). In this case the firm’s profits
will typically be negative and reflect investment costs. As another case, the firm may make
investments to produce products sold at a market outside the two countries, and thus the
firm’s activities may have no benefits (or costs) for other sectors of the two economies.
A third case is where investments Ki aﬀect the costs of producing a domestic, private
good that the firm sells to consumers at a price subject to regulation. The regulated
price will typically reflect the marginal cost of producing the good and thus depend on
Ki. Consumers’ surplus as well as the firm’s profits will thus in the end depend on these
investments To keep the analysis simple we will assume that in such a case there is no
need for any jurisdiction to modify its pricing rule in order to aﬀect investment incentives.
(That is, the dichotomy property (Laﬀont -Tirole 1993) holds, see below for a detailed
exposition). In all these cases we can thus write the firm’s joint profits—before transfers—as
a function of joint investments (Π(K1,K2, θ)), and the benefits accruing to other groups
of each jurisdiction (e.g. consumers) as a function of local investments there (B˜i(Ki)).
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The firm has private information regarding its eﬃciency, represented by the eﬃciency
parameter θ. Accounting for transfers, the net profits for the firm are π = Π + T1 + T2,
and the welfare for jurisdiction j then takes the form
Wj = B˜j(Kj)− (1 + λj)Tj + αjπ
= (1 + λj) [Bj(Kj) +Π(K1,K2, θ) + Ti]− (1 + λj − αj)π (1)
where λj is the general equilibrium shadow cost of public funds in country j, Bj(Kj) =
B˜j(Kj)/(1 + λj), and αj is the owner share of country j in the MNE.5
Before proceeding with the analysis in terms of the ’reduced form’ welfare function
(1), we look more closely at the cases indicated above. An important case is where the
firm produces private goods subject to price regulation. So suppose investments Kj aﬀect
the costs of producing a domestic, private good that the firm sells to consumers at a
(uniform) price subject to regulation. Let cj = cj(Kj) be the marginal cost, which is
assumed verifiable. Let yj denote the verifiable quantity (or quality) of the good sold, and
Sj(yj) the associated gross consumer surplus. The firm’s gross profits (before transfers)
are then
Π(K1,K2, θ; y) = Σi(pi − ci(Ki))yi −C(K1,K2, θ)
where pi = S0i(yi) is the price of the good in country i, and C(K1,K2, θ) captures invest-
ment costs. Net profits for the firm are π = Π+ΣTi, and welfare in country j is then given
by
Wj = Sj(yj)− pjyj − (1 + λj)Tj + αjπ
Given Kj , and hence cj , the optimal regulated price in country i is given by the Ramsey
formula
p∗j − cj(Kj)
p∗j
=
λj
1 + λj
1
η
, η = − yj
pj(yj)pj
As formulated here the model satisfies the dichotomy property (Laﬀont-Tirole 1993), and
so there is no strategic motive for any country to deviate from the autarcic optimal pricing
policy. The price, the quantity and the production costs for the private good in each
country will thus be functions of the domestic investment Kj (and the domestic marginal
cost of public funds λj). We may then define reduced-form expressions for consumers’
5Benefits as well as profits may depend on λj , eg. when the firm produces and sells private goods
subject to regulation. This dependence is suppressed in the notation.
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surpluses and profits as follows:
B˜j(Kj) = Sj(yj(Kj,λj))− p∗j(Kj ,λj)y∗j (Kj,λj) (2)
Π(K1,K2, θ) = Σi(p∗i (Ki,λi)− ci(Ki))y∗i (Ki,λi)−C(K1,K2, θ) (3)
With these definitions, we obtain the reduced-form welfare function (1). For future refer-
ence we also note here that with linear demand, say
pj = S
0
j(yj) = Aj − djyj
the regulated optimal quantity is y∗j =
1+λj
1+2λj
Aj−cj
dj
, yielding
B˜j(Kj) =
1
2dj
(1 + λj)2
(1 + 2λj)2
(Aj − cj(Kj))2 + s0 (4)
Π(K1,K2, θ) = Σi
(1 + λi)λi
di(1 + 2λi)2
(Ai − ci(Ki))2 −C(K1,K2, θ) (5)
We also note that the case of an unregulated private good corresponds to the limiting case
of λj →∞ in the last two formulas.
Another case of interest is where the firm may perfectly price discriminate and all
consumers (in each jurisdiction) have the same preferences. The firm is then able to
be able to extract the entire consumer surplus. By the dichotomy property the eﬃcient
quantity of the good is given by S0j(yj)− cj = 0 Welfare can then be represented in the
reduced form (1) when we define B˜j(Kj) ≡ 0 and
Π(K1,K2, θ) = max
y1,y2
Σi(Si(yi)− ci(Ki))yi −C(K1,K2, θ)
Finally, if the good is a public good and hence not sold to consumers the eﬃcient
quantity of the good is y∗j = y
∗
j (Kj,λj) given by S0j(y∗j )− (1+λj)cj(Kj) = 0 (again due to
the dichotomy property). The reduced form welfare function is then obtained by defining
B˜j(Kj) = Sj(y
∗
j (Kj ,λj)) and
Π(K1,K2, θ) = −Σici(Ki)y∗i (Ki,λi)−C(K1,K2, θ)
Investments and outside options. The MNE also has an option of investing in
another economic area. To simplify we assume that if the MNE exercises this option, it
moves all its operations to this region.6 We further assume that it is not optimal for the
6Given a passive government in the outside region, this assumption mainly serves to simplify notation.
An alternative setup would be to assume that the MNE in equilibrium actually invests in a third country,
in which case the outside option would be to reschedule a larger fraction of its activities to this country.
This alternative approach would generate the same qualitative results; see the appendix.
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MNE to make all its investments only in country 1 or in country 2. There are several
examples that may motivate this assumption. First, consider a vertically integrated MNE
which is located in two EU-countries (e.g., coal mining and natural gas extraction). Ex-
traction levels exceed local demand, and excess output is exported to the neighbouring
country, due to high transportation costs. Such a firm cannot credibly threaten to concen-
trate all its activities in only one of the countries. The outside option of the firm may be to
extract natural resources and serve customers in another region. A second case is an MNE
(e.g., in the food industry), that is presently located in two EU-countries.7 The MNE is
likely to maintain some activity in both countries due to irreversible investments that have
been made in production facilities. Even without the presence of fixed factors, the firm
may want to be present in both of the countries in order to be close to the customers and
thus closely observe changing consumer patterns.8 A third explanation for localisation in
several countries is that the MNE is a multi-product firm, e.g., a producer of household
appliances or semi-conductors, and that the countries diﬀer with respect to the presence
of industrial clusters for diﬀerent types of products.9 Lower trade costs may open up the
possibility to locate in low cost or low tax regions, i.e., outside options may emerge. In
these examples the firm will be expected to have some representation in both countries,
provided that it remains in the region. Still, changes in taxes or regulations may instigate
considerable rescheduling of its activity levels in the two countries.
Investments are assumed to be substitutes
∂2Π
∂K1∂K2
(K1,K2, θ) < 0 (6)
There are various reasons for assuming substitutability. There may be interaction eﬀects
in terms of joint costs, e.g. represented as a convex cost term C(K), K = K1 + K2,
in the profit function. These joint costs may have diﬀerent interpretations. First, K
may represent scarce human capital, e.g., management resources or technical personnel,
where we assume that the MNE faces convex recruitment and training costs. Second, K
may represent real investments, where C(K) are management and monitoring costs of
7The division of investments may have historical explanations, e.g., that the output is sold to consumers
in both countries and that there used to be large transportation costs or other trade barriers.
8This is important for products characterised by local variations in taste, and where product develop-
ment, design and fashion are important. The food and furniture industries are examples.
9An example of a firm with such a dispersed manufacturing structure is Phillips. The value of the MNE
may be closely linked to its business strategy of supplying multiple products. If this is common knowledge,
a threat to become a niche producer that is located in only one country would not be credible.
7
the MNE. Economic management and coordination often become more demanding as the
scale of international operations increase, i.e., C(K) is likely to be convex.
The countries compete to attract scarce real investments from the MNE. The firm has
private information about θ and net operating profits in the two countries. It is presumed
that if the firm is eﬃcient in one country it is also an eﬃcient operator in the other country.
Eﬃciency types are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (θ)˙
with density f(θ) having support
£
θ, θ¯
¤
. The distribution satisfies the regularity conditions
d
dθ [F (θ)/f(θ)] > 0 and ddθ [(1− F (θ)) /f(θ)] 6 0. Eﬃcient types have higher net operating
profits than less eﬃcient types, both on average and at the margin: ∂Π∂θ > 0 and
∂2Π
∂θ∂Kj > 0,
j = 1, 2; where the latter inequality is a single crossing condition.
The MNE has an additional localisation alternative: it has an option to move all its
activity outside the two jurisdictions, e.g., to a low cost country. This investment option
would produce an after tax profit of n(θ), i.e., the firm has private information about the
alternative return on its scarce resources. Assuming that firms that have high returns in
the two jurisdictions also have high returns on outside options, we have n0(θ) > 0. We
consider here the case where the participation constraint is binding for some type(s) other
than the least productive one, i.e., for some type θ 6= θ. In these cases there are typically
countervailing incentives, where low-productivity types are tempted to claim to have high
productivity in order to secure themselves high rents. To illustrate these eﬀects, and yet
have a fairly simple model, we confine ourselves to cases where the participation constraint
is binding only for the least productive and the most productive type, i.e., only for θ = θ
and θ = θ¯. This will occur, for example, if the outside returns function n(θ) is ’suﬃciently
convex’, in a sense to be made precise below.
3 Cooperating countries
To assess the benefits of cooperation, we consder first the case where the countries coop-
eratively design their tax and regulatory policies. The countries (principals) then seek to
maximise the cooperative welfare given by W =W1+W2 (we assume λ1 = λ2) subject to
incentive and participation constraints for the firm. Incentive compatibility requires that
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the firm’s equilibrium profits (rents) satisfy10
π0(θ) =
∂Π
∂θ
(K1(θ),K2(θ), θ) (7)
The first-order condition (7) together with K0j(θ) > 0, j = 1, 2 are suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility.
The principals maximize expected welfare EW subject to the incentive compatibility
(IC) and participation (IR) constraints. A comprehensive analysis of this problem has
been given by Jullien (2000). Here we confine ourselves to the case of outside option
functions n(θ) that leave the IR constraints non-binding for interior types.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a θˇ ∈ [θ, θ¯] such that investments K1(θ),K2(θ) that max-
imize
B1(K1) +B2(K2) +Π(K1,K2, θ)− (1−
α1 + α2
1 + λ
)
∂Π
∂θ
(K1,K2, θ)
F (θˇ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
are increasing (K 0j(θ) ≥ 0). Suppose further that the associated rent π(θ) given by (7),
i.e., π(θ0) =
R θ0
θ
∂Π
∂θ (K1(θ),K2(θ), θ)dθ + π(θ), satisfies π(θ) ≥ n(θ) and
(a) π(θ) = n(θ) if θˇ = θ¯.
(b) π(θ) = n(θ) and π(θ¯) = n(θ¯) if θ < θˇ < θ¯.
(c) π(θ¯) = n(θ¯) if θˇ = θ.
Then (K1(θ),K2(θ)) together with the associated rent π(θ) is the optimal solution.
To interpret the cooperative solution, note that the first order conditions for optimal
investments take the form (double subscripts denote second-order partials)
∂Bj
∂Kj
+
∂Π
∂Kj
− 1 + λ− α1 − α2
1 + λ
Πθj
F (θˇ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
= 0. (8)
The first two terms capture the marginal surplus in production, the third term the marginal
welfare eﬀect associated with the firm’s rents. When θˇ = θ¯ - the conventional case - the
latter eﬀect is negative, i.e., it amounts to a welfare cost for all types except the most
eﬃcient one. Optimal investments are then lower than their first-best levels. If θˇ ∈ (θ, θ¯),
the last term in (8) is negative for θ > θˇ, so the welfare eﬀect associated with the firm’s
10To interpret this condition, note that if type θ + dθ mimics the less eﬃcient type θ (by investing
Kj(θ) instead of Kj(θ + dθ)), it obtains additional profits Π(K(θ), θ + dθ)−Π(K(θ), θ) relative to type θ
in country j. To avoid such behavior the principal must allow for this rent diﬀerential in the refulatory
scheme.
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rents is positive for such a type. For these types the incentive constraints are binding
upwards; the firm is tempted to mimic a more eﬃcient type in order to make it appear
that it has a better outside option. By inducing such a firm to invest more, and thereby
increase its ”internal” profits, π(θ), the incentive constraints for firms with lower eﬃciency
(types in the range (θˇ, θ)) are relaxed. This leads to overinvestments relative to the first-
best solution for these types.
4 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider now the case where the governments of the two countries compete rather than
cooperate. In this case the MNE relates to each government separately. The governments
cannot credibly share information and they act non-cooperatively. In the present context
it is natural to consider equilibria in transfer functions.11 Let Tj(Kj) denote the transfers
that the firm receives from government j, based on the firm’s investments in country j. For
multinationals, profits are not observable to the tax authorities, due to among other things
strategic transfer pricing. Transfers are therefore made contingent on investments, which
are assumed here to be the key verifiable variables for such a firm.12 A pair K1(θ),K2(θ)
of investment profiles is commonly implementable if there are transfer schedules Tj(Kj),
one for each principal, such that for every type θ the firm’s profits are maximal for this
pair of investments.
Lemma 2 In any (diﬀerentiable) equilibrium where IR-constraints are binding only for
types θ, θ¯ we have: There exists θˇ1, θˇ2 ∈ [θ, θ¯] such that equilibrium investments and profits
satisfy
ΠiθK
0
i ≥ −Π12K 01K 02, i = 1, 2 and K 01K02
¡
Π1θΠ2θ +Π12
£
Π1θK
0
1 +Π2θK
0
2
¤¢
≥ 0 (9)
∂Bj
∂Kj
+
∂Π
∂Kj
=
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
"
Πθj +Πθi
ΠijK
0
i(θ)
Πθi +ΠijK0j(θ)
#
F (θˇj)− F (θ)
f(θ)
. (10)
and Z θ
θ
∂Π
∂θ
(Kj(θ0),Ki(θ0), θ0)dθ0 + π(θ) ≥ n(θ), all θ, with equality for θ = θ, θ¯ (11)
11The Revelation Principle doesn’t hold for common agency games in general. Equilibria in ’tax func-
tions’ of the form considered here are not very restrictive, see Martimort and Stole (2002).
12 In principle, transfers may depend on other verifiable aspects associated with the firm, such as quan-
tities of goods produced and sold to domestic consumers. The assumed dichotomy property implies that
no principal can gain by conditioning transfers on such aditional variables.
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Condition (9) is a well known necessary condition for common implementability, de-
rived from the second-order conditions for the firm’s maximization problem. Except for
the parameters (θˇ1, θˇ2), the conditions (10) are analogous to the equilibrium conditions
derived by Stole (1992) and others for the conventional case where the outside value is
type independent. The conventional case corresponds to θˇ1 = θˇ2 = θ¯.
To understand condition (10) note that the terms on the LHS represent the marginal
eﬀect of increased Kj on country j’s surplus (adjusted by factor 1 + λ). The term on the
RHS represents the marginal eﬀects on rents (also adjusted by factor 1+λ). This term has
itself two components; the first is the conventional (direct) one, just like in the cooperative
case; the second is a strategic eﬀect, working through the change in foreign investments
(say ∂Kˆi∂Kj ) induced by the change in domestic investments. The foreign investment Kˆi is
given by ∂Π∂Ki (Kj , Kˆi, θ) = T
0
i and hence satisfies (T
00
i −Πii) ∂Kˆi∂Kj = Πij. In equilibrium the
first-order condition for Kˆi holds as an identity in θ, and by diﬀerentiating this identity we
obtain ∂Kˆi∂Kj =
ΠijK0i(θ)
Πθi+ΠijK0j(θ)
. This explains the formula (10). If investments are substitutes,
increasing in both countries, and commonly implementable, the strategic eﬀect will be
negative.
Apart from the strategic eﬀect, conditions (10) and (8) also diﬀer in the way that
condition (10) involves country-specific parameters θˇj and only domestic owner shares (αj).
The latter reflects an equity externality; country j doesn’t internalize the implications of
its policy for the firm’s foreign owners. This makes country j more aggressive with respect
to extracting rents. The equity and strategic eﬀects tend to have opposite eﬀects on
equilibrium investments.13
To derive suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium we confine ourselves to quadratic
versions (approximations) for the relevant functions. Then we have:
Proposition 3 Suppose countries are symmetric, θ uniform, B() and Π() have constant
second-order partials with Π12 < 0 (substitutes) and that ΣjB(Kj) +Π(K1,K2, θ) is con-
cave in K1,K2. Then investments K1(θ),K2(θ) is a diﬀerentiable equilibrium with IR-
constraints binding only for types θ, θ¯ if and only if (9), (10) and (11) hold for some
θˇj , θˇi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
13Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) analysed these eﬀects for the pure tax/no type-dependent outside option
case.
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In this case we obtain equilibrium investment schedules Kj(θ) that are linear in the
eﬃciency parameter θ. Figure 1 provides an illustration.. The first-best (full information)
investment schedules are then symmetric across the countries, and so are the second-
best (asymmetric information) schedules obtained in the cooperative regime. These are
depicted as, respectively, the heavy line (first-best) and the broken line (second-best) in
the figure. The thin line represents the investment schedule for a symmetric equilibrium in
the non-cooperative regime.14 Its qualitative properties are similar to those of the solution
under tax cooperation; there is underinvestment relative to the first-best for low-eﬃciency
types (θ < θˇj) and overinvestment for high-eﬃciency types (θ > θˇj). As discussed in the
next section, the relative positions of the investment schedules for the two tax regimes
will vary, depending on the parameters of the model. The figure depicts a case where
competition exacerbates investment distortions: investments under competition are for
low-eﬃciency types even lower and for high-eﬃciency types even higher than investments
under cooperation.
FIGURE 1
5 Properties of equilibria
In this section we will analyse properties of equilibria for the model. The following para-
metrization will be used
Bj(Kj) = b0 + b1Kj +
1
2b2K
2
j
Π(K1,K2, θ) = g +Σj
h
mθ(Kj + h) + kKj − 12qK2j
i
− 12a(K1 +K2)2,
F (θ) = θ for θ ∈ [0, 1],
with b1,m, k, q > 0; and b2 < q. With this parametrization the second-order partials of Π
are
Π12 = −a, Πjj = −(q + a), Πjθ = m.
Note that the version (4)-(5) has B00j > 0, so we allow b2 > 0. The assumption b2 < q
guarantees concavity of ΣjBj +Π.
As a reference point, the full information first-best solution is in this case given by
∂Bj
∂Ki +
∂Π
∂Ki = 0. This yields symmetric investment schedules that are linear in θ. The first-
14As discussed below, there will in this case also exist non-cooperative equilibria with linear investment
schedules that are asymmetric between the two countries. The symmetric equilibrium Pareto dominates
the other asymmetric equilibra.
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order conditions (8) for the cooperative case also yield linear and symmetric solutions,
and these exhibit underinvestment for low types (possibly overinvestment for high types)
compared to first-best investments.
In the non-cooperative setting; the equilibrium equations (10) have linear solutions, say
of the form Kj(θ) = Lj +K 0jθ, j = 1, 2, see the appendix. The slopes of the equilibrium
schedules are seen to be independent of θˇ1, θˇ2, and therefore the same as in the case of
a type-independent outside option. For symmetric countries (where α1 = α2) they are
also symmetric, so K 01 = K 02 = K 0. While the slopes K 0j of the equilibrium schedules are
uniquely determined (and equal), the intercepts Lj (or equivalently the parameters θˇ1, θˇ2)
are not unique and not necessarily equal, even when countries are symmetric. It turns
out that aggregate equilibrium investment K1(θ)+K2(θ) is uniquely determined, but the
model doesn’t fully pin down how this investment is distributed between the countries.
But the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is the symmetric one, and we will concentrate on
that equilibrium in the following.
Proposition 4 (i)The slopes K0j of the equilibrium investment schedules given in Propo-
sition 3 are unique and equal, but the intercepts of these linear schedules are generally not
unique. (ii) Aggregate equilibrium investment K1(θ) +K2(θ) and equilibrium profits π(θ)
are uniquely determined. (iii) For symmetric countries the equilibrium with the highest
total expected welfare is the symmetric one.
To provide some intuition for why there are non-unique equilibrium investments, con-
sider the case where the countries are symmetric, and a = 0, so that the firm’s operations
in the two countries are independent. There is then a symmetric equilibrium, where invest-
ments and transfer/tax functions are symmetric. But suppose one country, say country 1,
had taxed more aggressively, and in particular had left less profits to the most eﬀcient firm.
To secure participation for this type of firm, country 2 would then have had to leave larger
rents to it. The eﬃcient way to do this would be to induce higher investments—and hence
higher rents—for all types, so the investment schedule for country 2 would shift up. (By
the independence assumption a = 0 there are no strategic investment eﬀects in this case.)
Conversely, when country 1 leaves less rents to the most eﬀcient type, it should leave less
rents to all types, and thus induce lower investments for all types. The new situation will
also be an equilibrium (provided the shifts are not too large), and it implies an asymmetric
taxation of—and thus an asymmetric provision of rents to—the most eﬃcient firm. In fact,
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corresponding to every division of the best type’s rent (within some range) between the
countries, there will be a distinct equilibrium with higher investments in the country that
provides the larger share of the rents.15 In the (intrinsic) common agency framework we
consider here, the equilibrium doesn’t pin down the way that the countries divide between
themselves the burden of providing rents for the firm, and this implies that equilibrium
investments are not uniquely pinned down either. While this discussion has been con-
fined to the simple case of independent operations (a = 0), it is clear that substitution
possibilities will aﬀect, but not eliminate, the mechanisms that generate non-uniqueness.
We now turn to a comparison of resource allocations under the cooperative and the
non-cooperative regimes. In the following we assume that the Pareto-preferred symmetric
equilibrium is chosen under non-cooperation.
Proposition 5 There is a critical number Ψ < 1, (Ψ = 1/(1+ q−b24a ),
q−b2
a =
B00+Π11
Π12 −1),
such that for α1+α21+λ > Ψ we have: The firm’s profits are for all types θ ∈ (θ, θ¯) lower when
the countries compete than when they cooperate. Hence, the IR constraint for type θ¯ is
either (i) binding in both regimes, (ii) binding only in the competitive regime, or (iii)
non-binding for both regimes. Investments are in case (iii) lower for all types (but type
θ¯) under competition compared to cooperation. In cases (i) and (ii), investments under
competition are (in the symmetric equilibrium) lower for ineﬃcient types (all θ < θ˜, some
θ˜ < θ¯) and higher for eﬃcient types (θ > θ˜) compared to investments under cooperation.
For α1+α21+λ < Ψ the converse conclusions hold.
16
The proposition says that the firm’s profits are lower (higher) in the competitive regime
when the ’inside’ owner share α1+α2 is large (small). Figure 1 illustrates the investment
comparisons for the case of ’large’ α1 + α2. The result parallels that in Olsen and Os-
15The most asymmetric equilibrium of this sort has θˇ1 = 1 and θˇ2 = 0, implying that there are underin-
vestments relative to first-best for all types (but the best) in country 1, and overinvestments for all types
(but the worst) in country 2. For substitutes (a > 0) the asymmetries may—due to the firm’s investment
response—be even more pronounced, so that there are under(over)investments in country 1 (country 2) for
all types.
16That is; the firm’s profits are for all types θ ∈ (θ, θ¯) higher when the countries compete than when they
cooperate. Hence, the IR constraint for type θ¯ is either (i) binding in both regimes, (ii) binding only in
the cooperative regime, or (iii) non-binding for both regimes. Investments are in the latter case (iii) higher
for all types (but type θ¯) under competition compared to cooperation. In cases (i) and (ii), investments
under competition are (in the symmetric equilibrium) higher for ineﬃcient types (all θ < θ˜, some θ˜ < θ¯)
and lower for eﬃcient types compared to investments under cooperation.
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mundsen (2001) for the pure tax/no outside option case. When inside owner shares are
large the equity externalities are large, and this leads to more aggressive rent extraction
when countries compete compared to when they cooperate.
The conditions in the proposition can also be related to the ease with which capital
can be substituted between the two countries. The elasticity of substitution between K1
and K2 for the firm’s symmetric pre-transfer profit function Π(K1,K2, θ), evaluated at
the point K1 = K2 = 12KF (θ), where KF (θ) is the first-best investment in each country,
is σ = 2aq + 1.
17 In view of this, the last proposition says that the firm’s rents tend to be
lower under competition compared to cooperation when the elasticity of substitution is
small. Thus, it is when substitution is relatively diﬃcult (aq small) that the firm tends to
be worse oﬀ when the countries compete compared to when they cooperate. Moreover, we
see that these eﬀects are amplified when B00 = b2 is small, i.e. when the benefit function
is less convex (more concave) in investments.
We now consider the meaning of these conditions for the important and specific case
where the firm produces and sells a private good to consumers at regulated prices. For the
quadratic version of that case we note that B00(K) is proportional to 1/d, where d is the
(common) slope of the demand for the good. (This also assumes that investments aﬀect
productions costs linearly; c(Kj) = c0 −Kj). We obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 When the firm sells private goods subject to price regulation as in (2) —
(5), the critical number Ψ < 1 in Proposition 4 is given by Ψ = C12/
h
− (1+λ)
2
d(1+2λ)2 +Cii
i
.
So, for α1+α21+λ > Ψ the firm’s profits are for all types θ ∈ (θ, θ¯) lower when the countries
compete than when they cooperate. This condition holds if demand is ’inelastic’ (d large),
the investment cost function has a low elasticity of substitution (C12Cii small), or if domestic
owner shares are large. The associated investment pattern leads to regulated prices that are
higher for low-eﬃciency firms (lower for high-eﬃciency firms) under competition compared
to cooperation. Conversely, if demand is more elastic, the investment cost function has
a high elasticity of substitution, and/or domestic owner shares are low, regulated prices
will be lower for low-eﬃciency firms and higher for high-eﬃciency firms under competition
compared to coordination. The firm’s profits are then also higher in the competitive regime.
So all else equal, when demand is relatively elastic the firm will benefit from compe-
17For the quadratic (and symmetric) functional form we find, for symmetric investments; σ =
q+2a
q
(KF (θ)
Kj
− 1), where KF (θ) = mθ+kq+2a .
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tition among regulators. Absent a type-dependent outside value the firm would then be
induced to invest more in the competitive regime, and regulated prices would be lower in
that regime. When high-eﬃciency firms have a (type-specific) favorable outside option,
regulatory competition will lead those high-eﬃciency firms to invest less and to charge
higher prices than they would in a cooperative regime. The outside option thus reverses
the comparative results for high-eﬃciency firms in this case.
We finally consider comparative statics eﬀects of variations in the outside value for the
firm. This analysis is complicated by the fact that the equilibrium in principle depends on
the whole profile of outside values (over all types), and hence that the exercise in general
should involve comparisons of all such profiles. We limit ourselves to profiles that generate
the type of equilibrium studied above, i.e. where the participation constraints are binding
only for the most eﬀcient and least eﬃcient types. We will show that if n1(θ) and n2(θ)
are two such profiles, and n1(θ) ≥ n2(θ), then under competition it will under certain
conditions be the case that the higher profile n1(θ) yields a greater social surplus than the
lower profile n2(θ). Hence all parties may gain when the firm’s outside option becomes
more favorable! This will not occur when the countries cooperate, since the higher profile
implies a stricter set of participation constraints and therefore if anything a lower total
surplus.
All else equal (technology, demand, owner shares etc.) an equilibrium of the form
studied in this paper is determined by the outside option values for the most eﬃcient and
the least eﬃcient types of the firm, or more precisely by the diﬀerence n(θ¯)− n(θ). This
single number, which we will denote by η, determines how the equilibrium depends on the
outside value profile. Normalizing n(θ) = 0, we have η = n(θ¯). Such an equilibrium is
only feasible for η in some range (η1, η2). The lower bound η1 of this range is the rent that
would accrue to the best type in the conventional case with type-independent reservation
profit. This corresponds to the case θˇ1 = θˇ2 = θ¯ in our model. The upper bound η2 is the
profit that would accrue to the best type if on the other hand θˇ1 = θˇ2 = θ.
For η in this range, the firm’s equilibrium profit is unique and given by a convex
function π(θ; η). Here η is used as an indexing parameter; we have π(θ¯; η) = η. Note
that any outside value profile that satisfies n(θ) = π(θ; η) = 0, n(θ¯) = π(θ¯; η) = η, and
n(θ) ≤ π(θ; η), will generate such an equilibrium. Let N(η) denote the family of all such
profiles. Formally
Definition. For η in (η1, η2), let N(η) be the family of all outside value profiles
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that satisfy n(θ) = 0, n(θ¯) = η and n(θ) ≤ π(θ; η), where π(θ; η) is (uniquely) given by
π(θ; η) =
R θ
θ
∂Π
∂θ
¡
K1(θ0),K2(θ0), θ0
¢
dθ0, π(θ¯; η) = η, and Kj(θ), j = 1, 2 satisfy (10) and
(11) with θˇj ∈ (θ, θ¯), j = 1, 2.
We will study how the equilibrium outcome associated with an outside value profile in
the family N(η) varies when η varies on the interval (η1, η2). Each profile in N(η) yields
equilibrium profits π(θ; η), and this function is increasing in η. A more favorable outside
option, in the sense of one that yields an outside value that is higher for the best type (η)
and that belongs to the corresponding family N(η), will thus lead to equilibrium profits
that are more favorable for every type of firm.
Proposition 7 Let Ψ = 1/(1 + q−b24a ) < 1. Then for
α1+α2
1+λ > Ψ (respectively
α1+α2
1+λ < Ψ)
we have: For the family N(η) it is the case that, as η (the outside value for the best
type) increases on (η1, η2), the total value E(W1 + W2) associated with the symmetric
non-cooperative equilibrium first increases and then decreases (respectively decreases over
the whole interval). In any case, every type of firm benefits as η increases.
The proposition shows that the total surplus under competition is either (i) first in-
creasing and then decreasing, or (ii) monotone decreasing in the firm’s outside value index
η. More favorable outside opportunities for the firm will thus in some cases improve the
social surplus, although only up to some point. But the improvement may be considerable;
the eﬃciency loss relative to the first-best outcome may be reduced by as much as 75%
when the outside value increases this way.18
Note also that the condition that defines case (i) (α1+α21+λ > Ψ), is the same condition
that makes the competitive tax regime less attractive for the firm than the cooperative
regime. This is thus the case where domestic owner shares are large and substitution of
investments is not too easy for the firm. (And where demand is relatively ’inelastic’ when
the firm produces and sells a private good.) Since the surplus under cooperation will if
anything decline as η increases, we see that the relative performance of the competitive
regime will then improve as the firm’s outside opportunities become better. The total
benefits of cooperation will thus become smaller when the MNE gets more attractive
outside opportunities (e.g. in third-country tax havens with lax regulations), and the
incentives to cooperate will diminish in such cases.
18This reduction is obtained for α1 + α2 = 1, λ = 0 and B(K) = 0; see the appendix.
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To obtain some intuition for the result, consider the case α1 + α2 = 1 and λ = 0.
Then W1+W2 = B1+B2+Π, so only eﬃciency eﬀects matter for total welfare. Suppose
now that the IR-constraint for the high type is just binding initially (η = η1). Then we
have underinvestment in both countries. Consider a small increase of the outside value.
In order to accommodate higher rents for the firm, investments must increase. Since the
aggregate welfare eﬀect of increased rents is zero, while the eﬀect of increased investments
on the aggregate production surplus is positive (we had ∂W∂Kj > 0 initially), it follows that
the total welfare eﬀect associated with the higher outside value will be positive. The two
countries will thus in total benefit from the higher outside value oﬀered to the firm in such
cases.
6 Conclusion
We analyse a case where an MNE allocates investments between two countries (the home
region), while also having an outside investment option, e.g. a low cost region or a tax
haven. The two countries in the home region compete to attract the firm’s investments
and to tax the firm. The ability to tax the MNE is limited by private information, e.g.
facilitated by a large number of transfer prices for services provided among various aﬃliates
of the MNE. The firm has private information about its eﬃciency and net operating
profits in the two countries, and about the value of the outside investment option. It
has an incentive to report a low productivity in the home region, and at the same time
overstating its productivity on outside investments (exaggerating the value of its outside
option). However, the productivity in the home region and the foreign region are likely to
be correlated. Thus, the MNE faces countervailing incentives: it cannot at the same time
claim to be eﬃcient and ineﬃcient.
In the symmetric equilibrium there is significant underinvestments (relative to the first
best) for firms with low eﬃciency. If the participation constraint is binding for the most
eﬃcient type, there is overinvestment for the more eﬃcient types. Policy competition may
increase or decrease the firm’s rents, relative to policy coordination. A higher value of
the outside option is beneficial for the firm, and detrimental to the governments if they
cooperate. However, the countries can be positively aﬀected by a higher outside option
if they compete. Thus, enhanced outside options for the firm, e.g. due to reduced entry
barriers in other regions, may actually benefit the home governments and represent a
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Pareto improvement for those countries and the firm. In such situations a development
towards improved outside options will reduce the incentives for governments to cooperate.
It would be interesting to examine dynamic aspects of the model. For example, we may
assume that the eﬃciency of operations in the foreign region is determined by a learning-
by-doing process, in which case the second-period productivity in foreign operations is
a function of foreign investments in the first period. In designing first-period incentives
for the firm, the governments in the home region would have to take into account how
these incentives will aﬀect the outside options - and thereby the bargaining position of the
governments - in the second period.
We have assumed that the firm has private information about its operating profits
and about its eﬃciency level, whereas the investment levels are assumed to be subject to
symmetric information. Observability of investments may be a reasonable description for
physical capital, but not to the same extent for intangible assets. The latter may be im-
portant for MNEs, since they typically have high levels of R&D relative to sales.19 Also,
we assume that the MNE’s eﬃciency levels are perfectly correlated in the countries of
operation. Uncorrelated eﬃciency parameters, however, may be relevant if firms invest in
diﬀerent countries in order to diversify portfolios. Asymmetric information about invest-
ment levels, or uncorrelated information parameters, may represent interesting extensions
of the present model. However, each of these extensions would imply a multidimensional
screening problem, which is not yet fully solved, not even in a single-principal setting; see
Rochet and Chone (1998).
Appendix
Simultaneous investments in all regions.
Consider the case where the MNE may operate also in the ’outside’ country. The au-
thorities in this country are assumed to be passive. We can then interpret the pre-transfer
return function Π(K1,K2, θ) in (??) as a ’reduced form’ profit function that is the relevant
one for the firm’s operations in countries 1 and 2. To see this, let pre-transfer profits for
19Privately observed investments that are undertaken after the tax system is in place (moral hazard)
can be accomodated in the model by interpreting the profit function as an indirect function where such
investments are chosen optimally, conditional on the observable Kj ’s. Privately observed investments in
place ex ante would, however, be a part of the firm’s (multidimensional) private information. The model
can be interpreted as representing a case where the aggregate eﬀect of sveral such variables on profits can
be captured by a one-dimensional parameter.
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the firm when it is active in all three countries be given by Π˜(K1,K2,K3, θ). For any given
investments K1,K2 in the two ’inside’ countries, the firm will choose its investments in the
outside country so as to maximize Π˜(K1,K2,K3, θ). We can then simply let Π(K1,K2, θ)
be defined as the maximum value function; Π(K1,K2, θ) = maxK3 Π˜(K1,K2,K3, θ). Under
reasonable assumptions regarding Π˜(K1,K2,K3, θ), the indirect or reduced form function
Π(K1,K2, θ) will have the properties assumed in the main text.
The outside value is obtained when the firm completely withdraws from countries 1
and 2. We assume that the firm in that case is able to use an alternative technology that
yields profits given by some function Πˆ(K3, θ). For example, the firm may be able to bet-
ter exploit economies of scale or scope. The outside value is then n(θ) = maxK3 Πˆ(K3, θ),
and under reasonable conditions the outside value will be increasing and convex in θ.
For the kind of equilibria we consider in this paper (where participation constraints are
binding only for the least eﬃcient and the most eﬃcient types), the outside value should
be ’suﬃciently convex’. For example, as one of a set of suﬃcient conditions we may as-
sume the outside value to be more convex than the inside rent, i.e. n00(θ) > π00(θ). The
inside profit (rent) function will by incentive compatibility —under cooperation as well as
non-cooperation—satisfy π0(θ) = ∂Π∂θ (K1(θ),K2(θ), θ), see (7), where K1(θ),K2(θ) are the
equilibrium ’inside’ investments. Since K1(θ),K2(θ) and therefore π(θ) and its curvature
are determined by the properties of the function Π˜(), while n(θ) and its curvature are de-
termined by the (diﬀerent) function Πˆ(), there are clearly constellations of these functions
that make n(θ) more convex than π(θ).
Proof of Lemma 2:
Suppose principal i oﬀers the transfer schedule Ti(Ki). Define
Kˆi(Kj , θ) = argmax
Ki
[Π(Kj,Ki, θ) + Ti(Ki)] (12)
The Revelation Principle holds for principal j’s problem. By incentive compatibility the
agent’s maximal profit must satisfy
π0 (θ) = ∂Π
∂θ
(Kj(θ), Kˆi(Kj(θ), θ), θ)
Principal j’s payoﬀ is
EWj =
Z θ¯
θ
n
(1 + λ)
³
Bj(Kj) +Π(Kj(θ), Kˆi(Kj(θ), θ), θ) + Ti(Kˆi(Kj(θ), θ))
´
−(1 + λ− αj) π(θ)}dF (θ)
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By assumption Kj(θ) maximizes this objective subject to the IC constraint and IR-
constraints for the two end-types. The Hamiltionian for the problem is
H(Kj,π, θ, p) =
½
Bj(Kj) +Π(Kj, Kˆi(Kj , θ), θ) + Ti(Kˆi(Kj, θ))−
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
π
¾
f(θ)
+p
∂Π
∂θ
(Kj , Kˆi(Kj, θ), θ) (13)
The necessary conditions for an optimum include (Seierstad-Sydsaeter 1987, Thm 5 p 185)
p0(θ) = −∂H
∂π
=
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
f(θ), p(θ) ≤ 0, p(θ¯) ≥ 0
These conditions imply
p(θ) =
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
(F (θ)− c), 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
So we may write
p(θ) =
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
(F (θ)− F (θˇj)), some θˇj ∈ [θ, θ¯]
It is further necessary that Kj(θ) maximizes the Hamiltonian. The first-order condition
for that is (using the envelope property for Kˆi)
B0j(Kj)+Πj(Kj, Kˆi(Kj, θ), θ)+
p(θ)
f(θ)
"
Πjθ(Kj , Kˆi(Kj , θ), θ) +Πiθ(Kj , Kˆi(Kj , θ), θ)
∂Kˆi
∂Kj
#
= 0
In equilibrium we must have Kˆi(Kj(θ), θ) = Ki(θ). From the definition of Kˆi we can then
derive an (equilibrium) expression for ∂Kˆi∂Kj (see the text following the lemma). Substitut-
ing this expression and the expression for p(θ) into the first-order condition above yields
the formula (10). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
It is well known that for the conventional case with type independent reservation utility
(so θˇ1 = θˇ2 = θ¯) and contract substitutes (Π12 < 0) the system (10) has a unique solution
that satisfies the necessary conditions (9) for common implementability. (Stole 1992,
Martimort 1992) These necessary conditions for implementability are also suﬃcient in the
case of quadratic functions and contract substitutes, provided both schedules K1(θ),K2(θ)
are nondecreasing. The same reasoning shows that for given θˇ1, θˇ2 ∈ [θ, θ¯] the system (10)
has a unique commonly implementable solution. For θ uniform (so F (θ)−F (θˇj)f(θ) is linear)
this solution has moreover schedules K1(θ),K2(θ) that are linear in θ. From (10) we see
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(by symmetry) that the (constant) slopes are equal; K 01 = K 02 = K 0. Moreover, we have
(by symmetry and common implementability (9)) 0 ≤ 2−Π12Π1θ K
0 ≤ 1. (In fact it can be
verified by explicit solution of (10) that both inequalities are strict when B+Π is strictly
concave)
Let T1(K1), T2(K2) be a pair of transfers that implement the solutionK1(θ),K2(θ). For
each investment level Ki in the range of Ki(θ), the transfer function Ti(Ki) is uniquely
determined up to an additive constant (by the firm’s first-order condition). Moreover,
Ti(Ki) is quadratic, and for Kˆi given by (12) we have
∂Kˆi
∂Kj
= const =
Π12K
0
Π1θ +Π12K 0
∈ [−1, 0]
For such a Ti(Ki) consider principal j’s problem. The Hamiltonian for the relaxed program
of maximizing her objective subject to (IC) and IR for the end-types is given by (13). This
function is now quadratic in Kj, and we have
1
f(θ)
∂2H
∂K2j
= B00j +Πjj +Πji
∂Kˆi
∂Kj
≤ B00j +Πjj −Πji < 0
where the first inequality follows from −1 ≤ ∂Kˆi∂Kj < 0 and Πij < 0, and the second from
concavity of B + Π and Π12 < 0. This shows that the Hamiltonian is concave in Kj ,
and hence is maximal for Kj = Kj(θ). (Stricly speaking, this argument demonstrates
concavity of H for Kj in the range of Kj(θ0) , θ0 ∈ [θ, θ¯]. Ti(.) can be extended (as in
Martimort 1992) outside the equilibrium range such that the local maximum is also a
global maximum for H.) Moreover, the maximized Hamiltonian is concave (in fact linear)
in the state variable (π), and this is then suﬃcient for Kj(θ) to be optimal for the relaxed
program. (Seierstad-Sydsaeter 1987, Thm. 6 p.186 ). Since this solution by (11) yields
the agent a rent that satisfies the IR-constraints for all types, it is also a solution to the
non-relaxed program. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium equations (10) now take the form:
b1+ b2Kj(θ)+mθ+ k− (q+ a)Kj(θ)− aKi(θ) =
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
"
m+
maK 0i(θ)
aK 0j(θ)−m
#
(θˇj − θ),
(14)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The system has linear solutions of the form Kj(θ) = Lj +
K 0jθ, j = 1, 2. Equations (14) yield four equations for the six parameters that characterize
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the solutions, i.e., (Lj ,K 0j , θˇj), j = 1, 2:
m− (q + a− b2)K 0j − aK 0i = −
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
"
m+
maK 0i
aK0j −m
#
, (15)
b1 + k − (q + a− b2)Lj − aLi =
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
"
m+
maK0i
aK 0j −m
#
θˇj, (16)
The necessary implementability conditions (9) can be written, given K 0j > 0 as
0 ≤ a
m
K0j ≤ 1 j = 1, 2 and
a
m
K01 +
a
m
K 02 ≤ 1. (17)
The slopes of the equilibrium schedules are seen to be independent of θˇ1, θˇ2, and therefore
the same as in the case of no outside option. For symmetric countries (where α1 = α2) they
are also symmetric, so K 01 = K 02 = K 0. An equilibrium as described in Proposition 3 must
in addition satisfy π(θ¯) = n(θ¯) and π(θ) = n(θ), hence we must have n(θ¯)−n(θ) =
R θ¯
θ
∂Π
∂θ dθ,
i.e.,
n(θ¯)− n(θ) =
Z θ¯
θ
2X
j=1
m(Lj +K
0θ + h)dθ = m
£
(L1 + L2) + 2h+K
0¤ . (18)
While the slopes K 0j of the equilibrium schedules are uniquely determined (and equal)
under the conditions given in the last proposition, we note that there are only three
equations to determine the remaining four parameters that characterize the equilibrium
investment schedules. This leaves one degree of freedom, and we must therefore expect
that these schedules are not uniquely determined. In fact, suppose we have an equilibrium
solution (Lj,K0, θˇj), j = 1, 2. According to (18), the solution must satisfy L1 + L2 =M ,
where M is a uniquely determined constant. We can then construct a new solution by
letting the new intercepts satisfy this relation, and solve for the new θˇj-parameters from
(14). (This is feasible, at least for small variations in the intercept parameters.) This
proves the first part of the proposition.
To verify part (ii), note that total investments are ΣjKj(θ) = Σj (Lj +K0θ) and that
π0(θ) = ∂Π∂θ = Σjm (Lj +K
0θ + h). Since the last sum is uniquely determined and π(θ) is
given, we see that π(θ) as well as aggregate investments are uniquely determined for all θ,
as was to be shown.
To verify part (iii) note that total welfare isW1+W2 = (1+λ) [ΣB(Kj) +Π(K1,K2, θ)]−
(1+λ−Σαj)π(θ). Rents π(θ) are constant across the relevant equilibria. In these equilib-
ria investments are of the form K1(θ) = K(θ) + δ, K2(θ) = K(θ)− δ. By symmetry and
concavity of the objective ΣB(Kj)+Π(K1,K2, θ) it is maximal for δ = 0. This completes
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the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.
In the fully symmetric case one can easily solve for and compare the slope parameters
(K 0jC , K
0
j) of the investment schedules for the cooperative and the competitive regime,
respectively. One finds that (as in Olsen and Osmundsen 2001)
K0jC ≶ K0j iﬀ 1+λα1+α2 ≶ Ψ−1 = q4a + 1.
Consider the case 1+λα1+α2 < Ψ
−1. The investment schedule is then steeper in the competitive
regime (K 0jC < K
0
j). If the outside value function is type-independent (the conventional
case), then for both regimes the IR constraints are binding only for the low type θ, and
there is ’no distortion at the top’ (θˇ = θˇj = θ¯ in our notation). Hence we have KjC(θ) >
Kj(θ) for all types but type θ¯. (The cooperative schedule is flatter, and investment levels
are equal for θ = θ¯.) It follows that investments are lower under competition, and hence
that rents are lower in that regime too. Let π¯C and π¯ denote the rents accruing to type θ¯
in this case, under cooperation and competition, respectively. We have π¯ < π¯C . The least
eﬃcient type obtains rents n(θ) in both regimes. In the following we fix n(θ) and consider
various forms that n(θ) may take for θ > θ.
The IR constraints will continue to bind only for the least eﬃcient type in both regimes
as long as the outside value n(θ) is suﬃciently convex and n(θ¯) < π¯. Investments and
rents are then in both regimes the same as when the outside value is type-independent.
This covers case (iii) in the proposition.
Consider next π¯ < n(θ¯) < π¯C . Assuming n(θ) is suﬃciently convex, the IR constraints
for the cooperative case will not be aﬀected, while those for the competitive case will be
aﬀected in such a way that the IR constraint now becomes binding for type θ¯ in addition
to type θ. In the competitive symmetric equilibrium we then have θˇj < θ¯ and thus
overinvestments compared to the first-best for θ > θˇj . Since cooperative investments are
the same as in the conventional case considered above (IR constraints binding only for the
low-eﬃciency type), and thus exhibit underinvestment relative to the first-best, they must
also exhibit underinvestment relative to competitive investments (KjC(θ) < Kj(θ)) for
θ > θ˜, for some θ˜ < θˇj. We cannot have underinvestment for all types, since that would
imply uniformly lower rents in the cooperative regime, and we have assumed π(θ¯) = n(θ¯) <
πC(θ¯). Hence we have KjC(θ) > Kj(θ) for low-eﬃciency types (θ < θ˜). This covers case
(ii) in the proposition as far as investments are concerned.
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To see that rents are for (almost) all types higher in the cooperative regime in this
case, note that we have πC(θ) = π(θ), π0C(θ) > π0(θ) for θ < θ˜, and πC(θ¯) > π(θ¯). Since
both functions are quadratic (and therefore cannot cross more than twice), it follows that
πC(θ) > π(θ) for all θ > θ. This proves the statements regarding case (ii).
Finally consider an outside value n(θ) where n(θ¯) > π¯C > π¯. Again, given that n(θ) is
suﬃciently convex, the IR constraints will be binding for types θ¯ and θ under both regimes,
so we have πC(θ) = π(θ) = n(θ) for θ = θ, θ¯. It follows that the investment schedules
KjC(θ) andKj(θ)must cross (once). Otherwise the highest schedule would generate higher
rents for all types θ > θ, and this would violate πC(θ¯) = π(θ¯). Since Kj(θ) is steepest, it
must be below KjC(θ) for low-eﬃciency types, and this implies π0C(θ) > π0(θ) for these
types. This in turn yields πC(θ) > π(θ) for all θ in (θ, θ¯). The statements regarding case
(i) are thereby proved.
This completes the proof for the parameter configuration 1+λα1+α2 < Ψ
−1. The comple-
mentary case can be handled similarly. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Since the countries are symmetric with respect to technologies and owner shares, equa-
tions (15) admit unique solutions K0j, with K 01 = K02. For every η in (η1, η2), and every
outside value function in the family N(η), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the
form given in Proposition 4, with parameters L1 = L2 and θˇ1 = θˇ2 ∈ (θ, θ¯). From (16,18)
we see that these parameters are in fact linear functions of η; with Lj(η) strictly increasing
and θˇj(η) strictly decreasing. The total value E(W1+W2) associated with this equilibrium
can be written as
(1 + λ)
Z θ¯
θ
½
ΣiBi(Ki) +Π(K1,K2, θ)− (1−
α1 + α2
1 + λ
)
∂Π
∂θ
(K1,K2, θ)
F (θˇ1)− F (θ)
f(θ)
¾
dF (θ)
−(1 + λ− α1 − α2)
©
π(θ)F (θˇ1) + π(θ¯)[1− F (θˇ1)]
ª
,
where Kj = Kj(θ; η) = Lj(η) + K 0jθ, θˇ1 = θˇ1(η), π(θ) = 0 (by our normalization) and
π(θ¯) = η. Note that the partial derivative of this expression wrt. θˇ1 is zero. Using the
uniform distribution, the marginal eﬀect on total expected welfare ( ∂∂ηE(W1 +W2)) can
then be written as (1 + λ) times the following expressionZ θ¯
θ
X
j
½
∂Bj
∂Kj
+
∂Π
∂Kj
− (1− α1 + α2
1 + λ
)
∂2Π
∂Kj∂θ
(θˇ1 − θ)
¾
∂Kj
∂η
dθ − (1− α1 + α2
1 + λ
)[1− θˇ1].
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Using (10,14) and symmetry we can write this as·
2(1− α1
1 + λ
)[m+
maK01
aK 01 −m
]− (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)2m
¸Z θ¯
θ
(θˇ1 − θ)dθ
∂K1
∂η
− (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)[1− θˇ1]
Note that η = η1 yields θˇ1 = θ¯ = 1, and hence
sign
∂
∂η
E(W1 +W2)η=η1 = sign
·
(1− α1
1 + λ
)[1 +
aK 01
aK01 −m
]− (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)
¸
From (18) we see that ∂K1∂η =
∂L1
∂η =
1
2m . Diﬀerentiating once more we obtain
∂2
∂η2
E(W1 +W2)
(1 + λ)
=
½·
(1− α1
1 + λ
)[1 +
aK 01
aK01 −m
]− (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)
¸
+ (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)
¾
∂θˇ1
∂η
< 0
where the inequality follows from (17) and ∂θˇ1∂η < 0. Hence the total value E(W1+W2) is
strictly concave in η, and therefore increasing for some η if and only if ∂∂ηE(W1+W2) > 0
for η = η1. Using γ = 1− α11+λ , we have
∂
∂η
E(W1 +W2)η=η1 > 0 iﬀ γ[1 +
aK 01
aK01 −m
]− (1− 2(1− γ)) > 0.
Using (15), the condition is equivalent to −1 + ( q−b2a + 2)
a
mK
0
1 + 1− 2γ > 0.
Since (15) can be solved explicitly for K01 in this case, we find that the condition is
equivalent to 1 + γ + Q2 −
q
γ + γ2 + Q24 − 2γ > 0, where Q =
q−b2
a + 1 > 1. This holds
iﬀ 1 + Q > γ(Q + 3). Substituting for γ = 1 − α11+λ and Q =
q−b2
a + 1, we see that the
latter condition is equivalent to α11+λ >
2
4+(q−b2)/a . This is again equivalent to the condition
stated in the proposition.
Finally note that for η = η2 we have (by definition of η2) θˇj = θ = 0, and hence
∂
∂η
·
E(W1 +W2)
(1 + λ)
¸
η=η2
= [(1− α1
1 + λ
)[1+
aK 01
aK 01 −m
]− (1− 2α1
1 + λ
)](−1
2
)−(1− 2α1
1 + λ
) < 0
This completes the proof of the proposition.
We finally prove the assertion stated in the text following the proposition, namely that
i higher outside value may reduce the eﬃciency loss by as much as 75 %. To this end
consider the case B(Kj) ≡ 0, λ = 0, αi = .5. Note that for η = η1 (where θˇ1 = 1) we have
(see (10,14))
K1(θ) = L+K 01θ =
k +m
q + 2a
+K01(θ − 1)
For η > η1 we thus have
K(θ; η) =
η − η1
2m
+
k +m
q + 2a
+ (θ − 1)K 01
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We also have
Π(K,K, θ) = 2
h
g +m(K + h)θ + kK − q
2
K2
i
− a
2
(2K)2
= 2(g +mhθ) + (mθ + k)
2
q + 2a
− (q + 2a)
·
mθ + k
q + 2a
−K
¸2
So we may write
Π(K(θ; η),K(θ; η), θ) = ΠF (θ)− (q + 2a)
·µ
m
q + 2a
−K01
¶
(θ − 1)− η − η1
2m
¸2
where ΠF (θ) is first-best profits. This yields
EW (η) = EWF − (q + 2a)
"µ
m
q + 2a
−K 01
¶2 1
3
+
µ
m
q + 2a
−K 01
¶
η − η1
2m
+
µ
η − η1
2m
¶2#
where EWF is first-best total expected welfare (for λ = 0,α = .5). Under the stated
conditions we have mq+2a −K
0
1 < 0, and it follows that we have
max
η
EW (η) = EWF−(q+2a)
µ
m
q + 2a
−K 01
¶2 ·1
3
− 1
4
¸
= EWF−(EWF−EW (η1))[1−
3
4
]
The eﬃciency loss is thus reduced by 75% when η increases from η1 to its optimal value.
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Figure 1. First-best (heavy line), cooperative (dotted line) and non-cooperative (thin
line) equilibrium investments as functions of eﬃciency parameter θ. (Plot generated with
model in Section 5; parameter values λ = .5, α = .5, m = 1, q = 4, a = .5, k = 2, h = 0,
n(θ¯) = . 97, n(θ) = 0.)
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